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Abstract
We propose and test a theory of using commodities as collateral for financing. Un-
der capital control and collateral constraint, investors import commodities and pledge
them as collateral to earn higher expected returns. Higher collateral demands increase
commodity prices and make the inventory–convenience yield relation less negative. Our
model illustrates these equilibrium effects and suggests that the violation of covered
interest-rate parity is a proxy for collateral demands. Evidence from eight commodi-
ties in China and developed markets supports the theoretical predictions. Our findings
complement the theory of storage and provide new insights into the financialization of
commodity markets. (JEL G12, Q02)
∗For helpful comments, we thank two anonymous referees, Stefan Nagel (Editor), Steven Baker (discussant),
Hank Bessembinder, Hui Chen, Ing-Haw Cheng (discussant), Darrell Duffie, Louis Ederington (discussant), Brian
Henderson (discussant), Jonathan Parker, Jun Pan, Leonid Kogan, Paul Mende, Anna Pavlova, Robert Pindyck,
Bryan Routledge (discussant), Geert Rouwenhorst, Martin Schneider, Ken Singleton, Chester Spatt (discussant),
Bill Tierney, Yajun Wang (discussant), Liyan Yang, and Wei Xiong, as well as seminar and conference participants
at the Duke–University of North Carolina Asset Pricing Conference, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the China International Conference in Finance, J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities at the University
of Colorado Denver, Zhejiang University, the NBER Chinese Economy meeting, the NBER Commodity Markets
meeting, the Mitsui Finance Symposium, the University of Oklahoma Energy Finance Research Conference, and
the American Finance Association annual meeting. Tang acknowledges financial support from the National Science
Fund of China for Distinguished Young Scholars Grant (number 71325007). Send correspondence to Haoxiang Zhu,
MIT Sloan School of Management, 100 Main Street E62-623, Cambridge, MA 02142; telephone: (617)253-2478.
E-mail: zhuh@mit.edu.
This paper proposes and tests a theory of using commodities as collateral for financing.
If the unsecured interest rate in a country is sufficiently higher than that in international
markets after hedging currency risk, and if capital control prevents the flow of “arbitrage”
capital, then financial investors would import commodities to the high-interest-rate country
and use them as collateral to earn a higher expected return. As a vehicle to circumvent
capital control, the financing (rather than production) use of commodities has significant
impacts on global commodity markets.
Studying the collateral use of commodities is important for at least two reasons. First, it
is a new and unexplored channel for the financalization of commodity markets. A number of
recent studies present evidence that financial investors affect the price dynamics in commodity
markets (see, for example, Tang and Xiong 2012; Singleton 2014; Henderson, Pearson, and
Wang 2015; Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong 2015; and Baker 2014, among others). These
studies cover a wide range of commodity markets, including spot markets, futures markets,
and structured products, but none of them address the use of commodities as collateral for
financing.
Second, and more broadly, the collateral use of commodities concretely illustrates an
unintended consequence of capital control. Commodities are imported to circumvent capital
control, just like off-balance-sheet vehicles were set up to take advantage of certain accounting
rules before the global financial crisis (asset-backed commercial paper is one major example).
Both forms of “shadow banking” lead to market distortions. Moreover, collateral demands of
commodities can create spillover into the real economy by affecting the prices of production
assets.
The best market in which to study the collateral use of commodities is China. China is
the world’s second largest economy and the leading consumer and importer of commodities,
accounting for about 40% of global copper consumption and steel consumption.1 China’s
financial market, however, is immature and underdeveloped. Small- and medium-sized firms
that have high expected returns but do not have sufficient collateral often find it difficult
to obtain financing from banks (see Elliott, Kroeber, and Qiao 2015). As a result, these
firms face high unsecured interest rates.2 Moreover, because of capital control,3 this funding
1For copper statistics, see International Copper Study Group (2013). For steel statistics, see World Steel
Association (2013).
2For example, the Wenzhou Private Finance Index shows that the recent interest rate on private borrowing is
about 20% in the Wenzhou metropolitan area, which is an entrepreneurial hub in the southeast of China. See
http://www.wzmjjddj.com/news/bencandy.php?fid=97&id=2333 (Chinese language website).
3The capital inflows to China’s financial markets from abroad are controlled by the “Qualified Foreign Insti-
tutional Investor” (QFII) program, managed by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). SAFE
grants the QFII status to selected foreign institutions, which can then invest in China’s financial markets. Each
QFII has a quota on the maximum amount it can invest. According to Reuters, as of November 2015, the
overall quota for all QFIIs was just below $80 billion (see http://www.reuters.com/article/china-investment-qfii-
idUSL3N13P3C720151130). Note that this amount is smaller than China’s FX loan volume backed by commodities,
as estimated by the industry. Conversely, capital outflows from China to international financial markets are con-
trolled by the “Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor” (QDII) program, also managed by SAFE. Each QDII
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gap cannot be filled by moving financial capital across the Chinese border. In a manner to
be described shortly, the combination of collateral constraints and capital control in China
makes it very attractive to import commodities as collateral. The industry estimates that in
2014 about $109 billion foreign exchange (FX) loans in China were backed by commodities as
collateral, equivalent to about 31% of China’s total short-term FX loans and 14% of China’s
total FX loans (see Yuan, Layton, Currie, and Courvalin 2014).4
We present a simple two-period, two-country model that formalizes the causes and effects
of financing using commodity as collateral. In the model, a representative fundamental
consumer of commodities in the importing country, say China, buys commodities from a
representative producer in the exporting country. Both countries have futures markets in
which agents can share commodity price risk. Due to capital control, financial markets of
the two countries are segmented, an extreme form of “capital immobility” (see Duffie 2010
and Duffie and Strulovici 2012). Trades of commodities, however, are not restricted by capital
control as commodities are input for fundamental consumption and not counted as capital
flow.
When the importing country has a sufficiently high unsecured interest rate relative to
the exporting country, after hedging foreign exchange risk, collateral demands for commodi-
ties emerge endogenously. Financial investors in the importing country conduct a series of
commodity and financial transactions, illustrated in Figure 1 (more institutional details are
provided in Section 1). In period 0 they borrow U.S. dollars (USD) through trade credit
at the relatively low unsecured interest rate and buy commodities, such as copper and alu-
minum. These commodities are imported and then pledged in the domestic market to get
secured, low-interest loans, which are subsequently lent to firms that have higher expected
returns but cannot obtain financing elsewhere due to collateral constraints. In period 1 all
borrowing and lending are unwound, and the collateral commodity is sold to the fundamen-
tal consumer. The financial investor can use the futures market in the importing country to
hedge commodity price risk. The financial investor can also trade currency forward in the
foreign exchange market to hedge currency risk (because borrowed funds are in USD and
investment returns are in Chinese Yuan [CNY]).
We characterize the equilibrium in which commodities are imported both for fundamental
consumption and as financing collateral. The model reveals that the collateral demand for
commodities has a number of important implications. For example, an increase in collateral
demand leads to an increase in concurrent commodity prices in both the importing and ex-
porting countries; a decrease in collateral demand does the opposite. The model also predicts
can invest in international financial markets, up to a specific quota.
4Take copper, for example. Economic Observer (2012) estimates that 90% of copper stored in the tariff-free zone
in Shanghai is for financing purposes, with the total amount more than 500,000 tons. Shanghai Metals Market, a
research firm, estimates that between 400,000 and 600,000 tons of copper have been used for financing in China in
2013. To put these estimates into perspective, a half-million tons of copper accounted for approximately 5.7% of
China’s annual copper consumption and accounted for 2.4% of the world’s consumption in 2012.
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Figure 1: A typical process of commodity-based financing
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that a higher collateral demand simultaneously increases inventory and convenience yield in
the importing country; a decrease in collateral demand simultaneously reduces inventory and
convenience yield. This comovement is complementary to the theory of storage, which pre-
dicts that inventory and convenience yield should move in opposite directions. To the best
of our knowledge, our theory is the only one that predicts a positive relation (conditional on
all else) between inventory and convenience yield.
We test the model’s predictions in the markets for eight commodities, including four
metals (copper, zinc, aluminum, and gold) and four nonmetals (soybean, corn, fuel oil, and
natural rubber). The importing country is China and the exporting country is developed
markets (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan). Our sample consists of weekly
observations of prices and inventories from October 13, 2006, to November 14, 2014. We test
how collateral demand for commodities affects (i) commodity prices and (ii) the relation
between inventory and convenience yield. In each test, we conduct eight commodity-by-
commodity regressions and two panel regressions for the metal group and nonmetal group.
Our theory also suggests that the predicted effects should be stronger in the metal group since
they have higher value-to-bulk ratios and are easier to store and ship than other commodities.
A main challenge in conducting the tests is the measurement of collateral demand. Al-
though it would be desirable to directly observe how much commodity is pledged as collateral,
such data could not be obtained due to the opacity of this market. Instead, we construct an
3
indirect, model-implied empirical measure: the forward-hedged interest-rate spread, which
has the following form:
Y = (1 +RCNY )− USDCNY Forward
USDCNY Spot
(1 +RUSD), (1)
where RCNY is the unsecured interest rate in CNY, China’s currency, and RUSD is the
unsecured interest rate in USD. In the commodity collateral trade, borrowed funds in USD at
the rate RUSD are converted to CNY at the spot exchange rate, and invested in China at the
expected return RCNY ; simultaneously, the principal plus interest on the USD loan, 1+RUSD,
are also converted to CNY at the forward exchange rate. Thus, by using commodities, the
financial investors effectively circumvent capital control and bring in funds to get higher
expected returns in China, after hedging currency risk. The other part of the profit in
importing commodities as collateral involves changes in commodity prices and storage costs,
but that part is standard and applies without capital control.
The true unsecured interest rates, RCNY and RUSD, at which the financial investors lend
and borrow are unobservable, but the unsecured interbank rates are observable. We therefore
construct the following empirical proxy for collateral demand:
Yˆ = (1 + Shibor)− USDCNY Forward
USDCNY Spot
(1 + Libor), (2)
where Shibor is the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate in CNY and Libor is the London
Interbank Offered Rate in USD. We elaborate in the data section why interbank rates are
better than some alternatives. The two exchange rates are the official spot exchange rate and
nondeliverable forward (NDF).5 Yˆ constructed this way can also be viewed as the violation
of the covered interest-rate parity, calculated using interbank rates. Without capital control,
Yˆ should be close to zero. But with capital controls, Yˆ may persistently stay away from
zero. In the data, we find that Yˆ is positive most of the time, implying a positive expected
profit for importing commodities as collateral. The more positive is Yˆ , the more attractive
it is to import commodities as collateral.
Empirical tests support our theory. In the first test, we find that a higher collateral
demand for commodities significantly increases the spot commodity prices in China and in
developed markets; a lower collateral demand of course does the opposite. The economic
magnitude is also large. A one-standard-deviation increase in collateral demand (proxied
by Yˆ ) increases the contemporaneous metal prices by about 3% in China and about 4%
in developed markets. This increase is the largest for copper traded on the London Metal
5An NDF is the same as a usual forward contract, except that on the delivery date, the NDF is cash-settled in
USD, rather than by physically delivering CNY against USD. This is because CNY is not freely convertible and
physical delivery is difficult. Before the development of the offshore CNY market in mid-2010, the NDF market
is the predominant means for foreign investors to take positions on the CNY. For more details on the USDCNY
NDF, see Yu (2007) and Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2014).
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Exchange, by about 5.3%. Reactions of nonmetal prices are smaller, at about 1.3% in China
and 2.9% in developed markets, for the same one-standard-deviation change in collateral
demand. These estimates remain significant and have almost the same magnitude if China’s
macroeconomic fundamentals are included as control variables.
In the second test, we find that a higher collateral demand for commodities makes the
inventory–convenience yield relation significantly less negative in China for metals. This
test distinguishes our theory from the theory of storage, which predicts that inventory and
convenience yield should move in opposite directions. In our theory of commodity collateral,
inventory and convenience yield move in the same direction in China. We find evidence
supporting both complementary theories. Inclusion of China’s macroeconomic fundamentals
as control variables affects neither the statistical significance nor the economic magnitude of
the estimates.
One salient conclusion from this paper is that high commodities prices do not necessarily
imply strong fundamental demand. Rather, high prices could be due to strong collateral
demand, driven by financial frictions and capital control in China, the largest commodity
importer and consumer. This implication resonates with Sockin and Xiong’s (2015) insight
that, with informational frictions, large financial inflows to commodity markets can be mis-
read as a favorable signal about global economic growth. Information frictions and collateral
demand can both potentially explain why prices of certain commodities (e.g., copper) reached
record highs in 2008, when global economic fundamentals turned out to be weak.
Another implication of our result is that collateral demand may lead to “excess volatility”
in commodity prices beyond economic fundamentals. Indeed, we find that collateral demand
and China’s macroeconomic fundamentals operate in a nonoverlapping fashion in driving
commodity prices. Moreover, since our proxy for collateral demand Yˆ is mean-reverting, the
evidence on prices is best interpreted as a temporary price effect, lasting for a couple of years,
rather than a permanent price effect, lasting for decades.
While the institutional settings of this paper are modeled after China, the essential friction
of capital control is more widespread. For example, since the global financial crisis, various
forms of capital control have been imposed in Brazil, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Ukraine,
and Iceland, among others (see International Monetary Fund 2012). To the extent that
capital control is now regarded as part of the policy toolkit for prudential regulation (see
Rogoff 2002 and Ostry et al. 2010), our results can be viewed as yet another reminder that
endogenous responses to capital control can cause unintended market distortions.
We caution that our current analysis does not lead to definitive welfare conclusions.
On the one hand, we show that collateral demand for commodities can partly crowd out
real demand and obscure the informativeness of commodity prices about global economic
growth. On the other hand, pledging commodities as collateral can relax funding constraints
and reduce inefficiency. Adding to this trade-off are the many costs and benefits of imposing
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capital controls in the first place (see Ostry et al. 2010). Analyzing the net welfare implication,
therefore, requires a much richer and more general equilibrium model, which we leave for
future research.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the financialization of commodity
markets. Tang and Xiong (2012) document that the growth of index investment into com-
modities coincides with a large increase in the correlation of various commodity prices. Basak
and Pavlova (2013) show that this elevated correlation can arise in a model in which institu-
tional investors care about outperforming a commodity index. Singleton (2014) and Cheng,
Kirilenko, and Xiong (2015) link the positions of various trader groups in futures markets
to commodity price dynamics. Knittel and Pindyck (2013) and Hamilton and Wu (2015)
conclude that index investing in commodity futures does not lead to significant inventory ac-
cumulation or predictability of futures returns. Henderson, Pearson, and Wang (2015) show
that the hedging activities of issuers of commodity-linked notes affect commodity futures and
spot prices. Baker (2014) shows through a theoretical model that easier access to commodity
futures by households can affect excess returns and volatility of commodities, but cannot
account for large price increases. Different from these studies, an essential element of our
theory and evidence is the collateral use of commodities, which is a novel contribution to the
literature.
Our theory and empirical findings are complementary to the classical theory of storage
(see Working 1960; Telser 1958; Brennan 1958; Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt 2000; Pindyck
2001; and Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst 2013, among others). For example, while
the theory of storage predicts a negative relation between convenience yield and inventory,
our model predicts that collateral demands for commodities simultaneously raise inventory
and convenience yield, a positive relation. Moreover, collateral demands simultaneously
result in a high total inventory and a high commodity price. This is again opposite to the
prediction from the theory of storage that an increased inventory indicates the abundance of
the commodity and hence a lower price.
1 Commodities as Collateral in Practice
In this section we discuss the institutional details of importing commodities as collateral
for financing, as well as the underlying financial frictions and risks. For more details on
international trade finance in general, see Moffett, Stonehill, and Eiteman (2011, Chapter
19).
A typical commodity financing transaction consists of a few steps.6 First, a Chinese
importing firm signs a contract to buy a commodity from an overseas firm. As is standard
6 For additional overviews of the institutional arrangements of commodity financing, see Yuan, Layton, and
Currie (2013), Garvey and Shaw (2014), and Fu (2014).
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in international trade, the importing firm uses the purchase contract to apply for a letter of
credit from a domestic or foreign bank.7 The letter of credit is typically granted in USD at
the USD interest rate and guarantees that the seller will be paid by the bank.8 To obtain
credit, the importing firm needs to pay a margin, which is about 20% to 30% of the loan
amount. The maturity of the letter of credit varies and is often between three and six months.
For example, if the letter of credit is granted for six months, the importing firm needs to pay
back the USD loan plus interest after six months. The importer can sell futures contracts in
China to hedge the price risk of holding the commodity.
Second, the importer ships the commodity to bonded warehouses in China’s ports and
obtains a warehouse receipt. Note that at this stage the commodity stored at a bonded
warehouse has not yet entered the Chinese customs, and the importer has not paid the
associated duties yet. The warehouse receipt is subsequently provided to a domestic bank as
collateral to obtain a CNY loan. A typical loan haircut is 30%—that is, the amount of the
CNY loan is 70% of the market value of the commodity. Typically, the interest on the secured
CNY loan is significantly lower than the expected return in other asset markets in China,
such as short-term lending to small businesses. Effectively, the importer uses commodity
collateral to capture the spread between the secured and unsecured CNY funding rates in
China.
Third, before the USD and CNY loans mature, the commodity importer receives the
unsecured return from its CNY investments and then sells the commodity stored in the
bonded warehouse in China’s ports. The importer also closes its futures position. The
proceeds of the commodity sale and investment returns in its CNY investment are used
to pay for the domestic bank loan in CNY (with relatively low CNY interest rates) and the
foreign or domestic bank for the letter of credit (with relatively low USD interest rates). This
completes a typical commodity financing transaction. The financial frictions in China are
sufficiently large for this series of trades to make a positive expected return. This expected
return should not be viewed as an arbitrage but a risk premium for taking credit risk in
China.
There are some variations of the above procedure. For instance, at the maturity of
the CNY loan, the importing firm may resell the commodity in the bonded warehouse to
an overseas firm, again outside Chinese customs, and subsequently repeat the commodity
financing procedure. This way, subsequent “importing” of commodities does not involve
physical shipments because the inventories are local. Thus, each ton of imported commodity
can be used to obtain financing multiple times.
7Sometimes two banks are involved in this process. One is the importer’s bank and the other is the exporter’s
bank.
8Banks involved in commodity trade financing include BNP Paribas, Cre´dit Agricole, ING, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale,
JPMorgan, Citigroup, Standard Chartered, and HSBC, among others. J. Blas and A. Makan,“Banks return to
commodities finance,” Financial Times, February 5, 2013.
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Another alternative arrangement involves the immediate sale of the imported commodity
to the Chinese spot markets. The proceeds of the sale in CNY are then invested to obtain
higher expected returns than the USD interest rates. A main difference of this procedure
is that the commodity has to enter customs and incur the associated duties, and repeating
this financing arrangement involves importing additional commodities, instead of recycling
existing commodities in bonded warehouses.
As we discussed earlier, the financial frictions that give rise to commodity-based financing
are twofold. First, China’s financial markets are immature, and many small firms cannot
obtain credit because they lack eligible collateral. Second, capital flows in and out of China
are strictly controlled. The combination of collateral constraint and capital control leads
to a relatively large unsecured interest rate in China, compared with developed economies.
Importing commodities as collateral is a direct consequence of these frictions.9
A primary risk involved in commodity-based financing is credit risk. For example, in the
third step of commodity-based financing described above, if its CNY investments default or
have low realized returns, the commodity importer may not have enough financial resources
to cover its USD unsecured loan and its CNY secured loan. The banks that provide secured
credit in this process can also suffer losses if commodity prices drop by more than the haircut
level.
To concretely illustrate the large scale of commodity-based financing and the associated
risks, Figure 2 shows the reaction of copper prices on the London Metal Exchange (LME) to
two China-specific events in the first half of 2014.
On Wednesday, March 5, 2014, Shanghai Chaori Solar, a Chinese solar equipment pro-
ducer, said it would not be able to pay the interest of $14.7 million on its corporate bonds
that was due that Friday.10 Following this announcement, the global benchmark copper price
traded on LME tumbled by more than 8.5% over a week, from $7,102.5/ton on March 5 to
$6,498/ton on March 12. Although the Chaori default is relatively small, it was the first ever
Chinese corporate bond default, and it likely led to a reassessment of corporate default risk
in China. A higher default risk reduces the risk-adjusted return for importing commodities
and using them as collateral.11
The second event is the probe by Chinese authorities of alleged frauds in the port of
9Moreover, the use of commodities as collateral may be viewed as part of China’s “shadow banking”—that
is, lending by non-bank institutions to borrowers who need credit. Elliott, Kroeber, and Qiao (2015) provide an
excellent overview of the current practice of shadow banking in China, including loans and leases by trust companies,
entrusted loans, microfinance companies, and wealth management products, among others. These activities are
predominantly domestic, concerned with how to bring capital to those who need it within China. An important
distinction of importing commodities as collateral is that it brings in international capital by circumventing capital
control through commodities. Once the commodities are imported and pledged to obtain low-interest CNY loans,
the use of the proceeds can be viewed as part of the “domestic” shadow-banking activity.
10G. Wildau and U. Desai, “China’s Chaori Solar poised for landmark bond default,” Reuters, March 5, 2014.
11X. Rice, J. Smyth, and L. Hornby, “Copper futures fall by daily limit,” Financial Times, March 12, 2014. I.
Iosebashvili and T. Shumsky, “China angst slams prices for copper,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2014.
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Figure 2: LME copper prices around two China-specific events
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Qingdao (in northern China) that some lenders may have pledged the same commodities
to multiple banks to get multiple loans.12 LME copper prices dropped by about 4% from
$6,930/ton on June 3 to $6,660.5/ton on June 6. Since multiple pledging of collateral is likely
to reduce the recovery value of commodity-backed loans in default, lenders may impose tighter
lending requirements, such as a higher haircut. This, in turn, reduces the attractiveness of
importing commodity as collateral and associated commodity prices.13
2 A Model of Commodities as Collateral
In this section we present a model of commodities as collateral.
There are two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}, and a single commodity. There is a representative
commodity-exporting country and a representative commodity-importing country. The ex-
porting country has a commodity supplier and a speculator. The importing country has
a commodity supplier, a fundamental user of commodity for production, and a financial
investor who imports commodity as collateral.
The commodity is priced in USD in the exporting country and priced in the local currency
(e.g., CNY) in the importing country. Expressed in units of local currency per USD, in
period t ∈ {0, 1}, the spot exchange rate is Xt. The forward exchange rate is fX in period 0.
Moreover, the commodity-importing country, which is modeled after China, imposes capital
12S. Thomas, “Standard Bank starts probe of potential irregularities at China port,” Reuters, June 4, 2014.
13F. Wong and M. Serapio Jr., “Worry plagues commodity finance trade after Chinese metals probe,” Reuters,
June 8, 2014.
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controls, so that its financial market and the financial market of the exporting country are
segmented. In particular, the covered interest rate parity may or may not hold.
For ease of reference, Appendix A lists the exogenous and endogenous variables we use in
this model. We use the superscript “e” (“i”) to denote quantities and prices in the exporting
(importing) country.
The rest of this section describes the model components in detail. The last subsection,
Section 2.8, discusses our modeling choices and potential alternative approaches. Equilibrium
solutions and implications are presented in Section 3.
2.1 The supplier in the exporting country
We directly model the net supply in the exporting country. Our model in the exporting
country is largely adopted from Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013). Let Iet and G
e
t
be the aggregate commodity inventory and production, respectively. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the
cost of storage; that is, the producer can store I units of the commodity at t− 1 and receive
(1− δ) I units at t. We also assume that the production schedule (Ge0, Ge1) is fixed ex ante
and is common knowledge. (Effectively, changing production in the short term is very costly.)
The inventory Ie0 , however, is a choice variable of the producer. Given the choice of inventory
Ie0 , the commodity sales in period 0 and period 1 are, respectively,
Qe0 = G
e
0 − Ie0 , (3)
Qe1 = G
e
1 + (1− δ)Ie0 . (4)
In addition to selling the commodity in the spot market, the commodity supplier shorts hep
futures contracts in the exporting country at the price of F e to hedge its inventory and
production.
Therefore, the terminal wealth of the producer is
W ep = S
e
0(G
e
0 − Ie0)(1 + re) + Se1(Ge1 + (1− δ)Ie0)− hep(Se1 − F e), (5)
where re is the secured interest rate in the exporting country and Set is the commodity spot
price in period t. We emphasize that Se1 is a random variable. As we elaborate shortly, S
e
1
is determined by the stochastic demand of the importing country in period 1. We denote by
σeS the volatility (standard deviation) of S
e
1.
The commodity producer has a mean-variance utility of the form
E[W ep ]−
γep
2
Var[W ep ]. (6)
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Substituting in the expression of W ep , we see that the producer solves the problem
max
{Ie0 ,hep}
Se0 (G
e
0 − Ie0) (1 + re) + E
[
Se1((1− δ) Ie0 +Ge1)− hep (Se1 − F e)
]
− γ
e
p
2
Var
[
Se1((1− δ) Ie0 +Ge1)− hep (Se1 − F e)
]
, (7)
subject to Ie0 ≥ 0.
We denote by λ ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inventory constraint
Ie0 ≥ 0. Taking the first-order condition with respect to the inventory Ie0 and futures position
hep, we get
Ie0 =
E [Se1] (1− δ)− Se0 (1 + re) + λ
γep
(
σeS
)2
(1− δ)2
+
hep −Ge1
(1− δ) , (8)
hep = I
e
0 (1− δ) +Ge1 −
E [Se1 − F e]
γep
(
σeS
)2 . (9)
If Ie0 > 0, λ = 0. If I
e
0 = 0, λ > 0. The endogenous λ affects the convenience yield of holding
the commodity.
2.2 The speculator in the exporting country
The speculators trade only futures in the exporting country, and their long futures position is
denoted by hes. They have mean-variance utility and solve the following optimization problem
max
hes
E [hes (S
e
1 − F e)]−
γes
2
Var [hes (S
e
1 − F e)] . (10)
The solution is
hes =
E [Se1 − F e]
γes
(
σeS
)2 . (11)
2.3 Market clearing in the exporting country
From Equations (8) and (9), we obtain
Se0 − F e
Se0
=
λ
Se0 (1− δ)
− r
e + δ
1− δ . (12)
Thus, the futures price in the exporting country is
F e =
Se0 (1 + r
e)− λ
1− δ , (13)
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By the futures market clearing, hep = h
e
s, we have
E [Se1 − F e] =
γesγ
e
p
γes + γ
e
p
(σeS)
2 [Ie0 (1− δ) +Ge1]. (14)
Since F e is solved, the above equation has two unknowns: E[Se1] and I
e
0 . These two variables
cannot be determined by variables in the exporting country alone; rather, we need the demand
from the importing country, which we turn to now.
2.4 The producer in the importing country
Symmetric to the exporting country, the commodity productions in the importing country
in the two periods are given by Qi0 = a0 and Q
i
1 = a1, respectively, where a0 and a1 are
commonly known constants. For simplicity, we will restrict attention to parameters such
that the commodity producer in the importing country does not wish to carry inventory
from period 0 and period 1. The condition is provided in the characterization of equilibrium.
Relaxing this parameter condition does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
2.5 The fundamental consumer in the importing country
We model the “fundamental consumer” in the importing country as a consumer who uses the
commodity as an input to produce final goods. In period t, the fundamental consumer has a
linearly decreasing average profit per unit of commodity input, expressed in local currency:
kt − Sit − lDit, (15)
where kt is a random variable, l is a constant, and D
i
t is the amount of commodity input used
at time t. In period 0, k0 is commonly known, but k1 is unobservable and has a mean of µk
and a variance of σ2k. This stochastic k1 can be interpreted as the “fundamental shock” to the
economy of the importing country, only realized in period 1. All players in our model have
symmetric information and the same probability distribution about k1. The fundamental
consumer has the mean-variance preference with parameter γid.
The fundamental consumer has three endogenous decisions in period 0: the amount of
commodities to import, Di0,f ; the amount of commodities to buy in the domestic market,
Di0,d; and the amount of commodity futures contracts to buy in the local market, h
i
d. The
shipment of one unit of the commodity across the two countries incurs the cost, in USD,
of h > 0. For simplicity, shipment is instantaneous; that is, a commodity purchased in the
exporting country at time t can be used in the importing country at time t as well. Also for
simplicity, we assume that the fundamental consumer does not hedge FX exposures and will
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convert local currency to USD at the exchange rate X1 in period 1.
14
The terminal wealth of the fundamental consumer consists of two parts. The first part,
denoted by W id,0, comes from the production profit in period 0 (adjusted by interest) and the
realized trading profits in commodity futures. Thus,
W id,0 = D
i
0,f
[
k0 − (Se0 + h)X0 − l
(
Di0,f +D
i
0,d
)] (
1 + ri
)
(16)
+Di0,d
[
k0 − Si0 − l
(
Di0,f +D
i
0,d
)] (
1 + ri
)
+ hid
(
Si1 − F i
)
,
where ri is the secured interest rate in the importing country. The first and second terms of
W id,0 are, respectively, the fundamental consumer’s production profits of using foreign and
domestic commodity supplies, adjusted by interest. The third term is the trading profit in
the commodity futures market.
The second part of the fundamental consumer’s terminal wealth is the production profit
in period 1, denoted by W id,1. We denote by D
i
1,f and D
i
1,d the period 1 demands for foreign
and domestic commodities, respectively. Then,
W id,1 = D
i
1,f
[
k1 − (Se1 + h)X1 − l(Di1,f +Di1,d)
]
+Di1,d
[
k1 − Si1 − l(Di1,f +Di1,d)
]
, (17)
We solve the fundamental consumer’s problem backward in time. In period 1, since the
fundamental shock k1 is realized and becomes common knowledge, the fundamental consumer
solves
max
{Di1,d,Di1,f}
W id,1, (18)
where there is no variance term since Si1 becomes known in period 1.
The solution is
Di1,d =
k1 − Si1
2l
−Di1,f , (19)
Di1,f =
k1 − (Se1 + h)X1
2l
−Di1,d. (20)
Substituting the solution into the fundamental consumer’s wealth W id,1, we get
W id,1 =
(k1 − Si1)2
4l
. (21)
Moreover, by market-clearing, Di1,d +D
i
1,f = a1 +G
e
1 + (1− δ)Ie0 , which is a constant known
in period 0. Thus, by Equation (19), we know that k1−Si1 is a constant as well. Hence, W id,1
14Since the fundamental consumer’s foreign commodity demand in period 1 depends on the realized shock k1,
this demand cannot be perfectly forecasted or hedged in period 0. Thus, even if the fundamental consumer hedges
a constant quantity of the commodity in period 0, he is still subject to FX risk in period 1 with probability 1.
Thus, for simplicity, we assume zero FX hedge. Note that the fundamental consumer’s wealth in period 1 is not
affected by FX hedging.
13
is a constant, viewed in period 0.
Now, moving back to period 0, the fundamental consumer solves
max
{Di0,d,Di0,f ,hid}
E[W id,0 +W
i
d,1]−
γid
2
Var[W id,0 +W
i
d,1], (22)
subject to Di0,f ≥ 0. (23)
But because W id,1 is a constant, the fundamental consumer’s period 0 problem reduces to
max
{Di0,d,Di0,f ,hid}
E[W id,0]−
γid
2
Var[W id,0], (24)
subject to Di0,f ≥ 0.
The first-order conditions yield
Di0,f =
k0 − (Se0 + h)X0
2l
−Di0,d + η, (25)
Di0,d =
k0 − Si0
2l
−Di0,f , (26)
hid =
E
[
Si1 − F i
]
γid
(
σiS
)2 , (27)
where σiS is the volatility of S
i
1 and η is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
(23). If Di0,f = 0, that is, the fundamental consumer only buys the commodity locally, then
η > 0. If Di0,f > 0, then η = 0.
2.6 The financial investor in the importing country
The financial investor in the importing country imports the commodity not for production,
but to use it as collateral to get secured financing at rate ri and lend unsecured at rate
Ri > ri. (Without loss of generality, the interest rates Ri and ri are after adjusting for the
haircut imposed on the loan.) In other words, the commodity is imported as a means to
capture the unsecured-secured spread, or risk premium, of Ri − ri. The financial investor
must first borrow an unsecured loan in the exporting country at the rate Re to pay for the
costs of the commodity and shipping. Since borrowing and lending take one period, this
trade must be completed in period 0. We also assume that the financial investor purchases,
in period 0 and at the forward exchange rate fX , an amount of USD that covers the principal
and interest payment of the USD loan, so that there remains no currency risk.
The expected period 1 profit of importing one unit of collateral commodity in period 0,
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expressed in local currency, is
Π = Si0(R
i − ri) + (1− δ)E[Si1]− (Se0 + h) (1 +Re)fX . (28)
The three terms capture, respectively, the expected profit of borrowing Si0 at rate r
i and
lending at rate Ri, the proceeds from selling the remaining (1 − δ) commodity in period 1,
and the payment of the unsecured loan at rate Re after converting to local currency. We
later specify the condition under which the expected profit of importing the commodity as
collateral is positive. We denote by Ci0 the amount of the commodity imported for collateral
purposes in period 0.
We emphasize that these “collateral commodities” must be imported for this trade to be
viable. If the financial investor were to use the domestic supply of the commodity, he must
first pay the unsecured rate Ri, defeating the purpose of lending at Ri.
The financial investor also uses futures contracts to hedge his inventory of collateral
commodity. We denote by hic his short futures position in period 0.
The financial investor’s terminal wealth in period 1, in local currency, is
W if = C
i
0
[
Si0(R
i − ri) + (1− δ)Si1 − (Se0 + h) (1 +Re)fX
]− hic(Si1 − F i). (29)
The financial investor has a mean-variance utility function with parameter γic. In period
0, he solves the problem
max
{Ci0,hic}
E[W if ]−
γic
2
Var[W if ], (30)
where the variance term comes from uncertainty about Si1.
Solving for the optimal Ci0 and h
i
c, we get
Ci0 =
Si0(R
i − ri) + (1− δ)E [Si1]− (Se0 + h) (1 +Re) fX
γic
(
σiS
)2
(1− δ)2
+
hic
1− δ , (31)
hic = −
E
[
Si1 − F i
]
γic
(
σiS
)2 + Ci0 (1− δ) . (32)
2.7 Market clearing in the importing country
From Equations (25) and (26), we get
Si0 = (S
e
0 + h)X0 − 2lη. (33)
Recall that η is the Lagrange multiplier associated with Di0,f ≥ 0; η > 0 whenever Di0,f = 0.
Thus, if all commodity imports are made for financing purposes, the commodity price in the
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importing country is lower than that in the exporting country after adjusting for shipping
costs.
From Equations (19) and (20), we get
Si1 = (S
e
1 + h)X1.
By the market-clearing condition of the futures market, hid = h
i
c, we have
Ci0 =
(
γid + γ
i
c
γidγ
i
c
)
E
[
Si1 − F i
]
(1− δ) (σiS)2 . (34)
For parameters considered in this paper, Ci0 > 0. From Equations (31) and (32), we can
solve the futures price in the importing country,
F i =
(Se0 + h) (1 +R
e) fX
1− δ −
Si0
(
Ri − ri)
1− δ (35)
=
fX
X0
(1 +Re)− (Ri − ri)
1− δ S
i
0 +
fX
X0
2l (1 +Re)
1− δ η.
2.8 A discussion of the model setup
In this subsection we make a couple of remarks on our modeling choices.
First, in our model the futures markets of the two countries are segmented; investors
cannot trade futures contracts across two countries. This assumption is a direct consequence
of capital control of the importing country, modeled after China. If investors were able to
circumvent capital controls and participate directly in financial markets in both countries,
importing commodities as collateral would be unnecessary. Indeed, in the model we can
show that if the financial investors can also trade futures contracts in the exporting country,
they would not import commodities. Thus, capital control and the effective segmentation of
financial markets are essential frictions in the model and in reality.
Second, we have used a two-period model, which may seemingly suggest that the unwind-
ing of the commodity collateral trade in period 1 is mechanical. But like many two-period
models, our two-period model is meant to illustrate the intuition in a tractable way, but
not a literal description of reality. Period 1 can be viewed as an abstract future date when
market conditions are such that importing commodities as collateral is no longer profitable.
One example of that future date is when (if ever) China drops its capital control.
3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section we characterize the equilibrium prices and quantities, as well as the compar-
ative statics with respect to the unsecured interest rate in the importing country, Ri. The
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analysis of this section lays down the foundation for empirical tests conducted in the next
section.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
Putting together the market-clearing conditions from the previous section, we have the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Technical Conditions 1–3 provided in Appendix B.1, in equilibrium,
the spot prices (Se0, S
e
1, S
i
0, S
i
1), the inventory I
e
0 in the exporting country, and the fundamental
demands (Di0,d, D
i
1,d) are given by the solution to the following system of equations:
Di0,d = a0, (36)
Ge0 − Ie0 = Di0,f + Ci0
=
[
k0 − (Se0 + h)X0
2l
−Di0,d + η
]
+
(
γid + γ
i
c
γidγ
i
c
)
E
[
Si1 − F i
]
(1− δ) (σiS)2 , (37)
E [Se1 − F e] =
γesγ
e
p
γes + γ
e
p
(σeS)
2 [Ie0 (1− δ) +Ge1], (38)
Di1,d = a1 +
(
γid + γ
i
c
γidγ
i
c
)
E
[
Si1 − F i
](
σiS
)2 , (39)
Ie0 (1− δ) +Ge1 = Di1,f
=
k1 − (Se1 + h)X1
2l
−Di1,d, (40)
Si1 = (S
e
1 + h)X1, (41)
Si0 = (S
e
0 + h)X0 − 2lη, (42)
where
F e =
Se0(1 + r
e)− λ
1− δ , (43)
F i =
(Se0 + h)(1 +R
e)fX − Si0(Ri − ri)
1− δ . (44)
The two Lagrange multipliers (λ, η) satisfy:
if Ie0 = 0, λ > 0,
if Ie0 > 0, λ = 0,
17
and
if Di0,f = 0, η = D
i
0,d −
k0 − (Se0 + h)X0
2l
> 0,
if Di0,f > 0, η = 0.
The solutions of spot prices and inventories are:
Si0 =
[
(1−δ)(k0−2a0l)
2l +mq + n (b− h+ zh)− [Ge0 (1− δ) +Ge1]
+ n1−δλ− 2l (om+ zn/X0) η
]
v + (1− δ + w)m+ ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)n , (45)
Se0 =
Si0 + 2lη
X0
− h. (46)
Si1 = q + k1 − µk − (1− δ)Si0, (47)
Se1 =
Si1
X1
− h, (48)
Ie0 =
1
1− δ
[
n (b− h+ zh)− ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)nSi0 −Ge1 − 2nlzη/X0 +
nλ
1− δ
]
, (49)
where the constants (m,n, q, b, v, w, z, o) are defined in Appendix B. The equilibrium de-
mands (Ci0, D
i
0,d, D
i
1,d, D
i
0,f , D
i
1,f ) are calculated from Equations (36)–(40).
The technical conditions for Proposition 1 imply the following two properties of the equi-
librium. First, collateral demand for commodity, Ci0, is positive in equilibrium.
15 Second,
the commodity producer in the importing country does not wish to carry inventory. Relaxing
this condition will lead to more parameter cases but does not change the qualitative nature
of the results.
The solution in Proposition 1 involves two Lagrange multipliers, λ and η. Depending on
whether they are zero or positive, there are four cases of equilibrium:
Case 1. λ = 0 and η = 0, that is, Ie0 > 0 and D
i
0,f > 0. In this case, the exporting country does
not have a stockout, and the fundamental consumer uses both domestic and foreign
commodities.
Case 2. λ = 0 and η > 0, that is, Ie0 > 0 and D
i
0,f = 0. In this case, the exporting country does
not have a stockout, but the fundamental consumer uses only domestic commodities.
This is because collateral demand is so strong that (Se0 + h)X0 > S
i
0.
Case 3. λ > 0 and η = 0, that is, Ie0 = 0 and D
i
0,f > 0. In this case, the exporting country has a
stockout, but the fundamental consumer uses both domestic and foreign commodities.
15The case of equilibrium with zero collateral demand can be obtained in a similar fashion, and is available upon
request.
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Case 4. λ > 0 and η > 0, that is, Ie0 = 0 and D
i
0,f = 0. In this case, the exporting country has
a stockout, and the fundamental consumer uses only domestic commodities.
The explicit solutions for the four cases are provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Comparative statics
We now characterize the comparative statics of equilibrium variables to the unsecured interest
rates Ri in the importing country.
Proposition 2. Fixing other parameters, if the unsecured interest rate Ri increases in the
importing country, then Si0, S
e
0, C
i
0, and yi have the following comparative statics in Cases
2, 3, and 4 of Proposition 1:
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Si0 flat (= k0 − 2a0l) increase flat (= k0 − 2a0l)
Se0 increase increase increase
Ci0 increase increase flat (= G
e
0)
yi increase increase flat
In Case 1 of Proposition 1, in the limit that γes converges to zero, an increase in R
i leads
to increases in Ci0 and y
i, and Si0 and S
e
0 are invariant to changes in R
i.
The easiest way to discuss the intuition behind these comparative statics is to go back-
ward, from Case 4 to Case 1 (for proof, see Appendix B). In Case 4, the exporting country
has a stockout and the fundamental consumer in the importing country uses only local com-
modities. The entire commodity supply in the exporting country, Ge0, is bought by the
financial investor as collateral. The commodity price in the importing country, Si0, depends
only on local supply and fundamentals. Thus, a higher Ri cannot affect Si0 or C
i
0, as these
two variables already hit a corner solution. The convenience yield in the importing country
is given by
yi = −F
i
Si0
+
1 + ri
1− δ =
(1 +Ri)− fXX0 (1 +Re)
1− δ −
2l
Si0
1 +Re
1− δ
fX
X0
η. (50)
Appendix B shows that the equilibrium η increases in Ri with such a proportion that yi is
also invariant to Ri. The fact that η increases in Ri also implies that Se0 increases in R
i since
Se0 = (S
i
0 + 2lη)/X0 − h.
Case 3 shares the feature with Case 4 that the exporting country has a stockout, but
the total supply Ge0 in the exporting country is shared by the fundamental consumer and
the financial investor in the importing country. As Ri increases, the financial investor’s
profit for importing commodities as collateral increases, so his demand goes up, pushing up
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his inventory Ci0 and the commodity price S
e
0 in the exporting country. The fundamental
consumer, in turn, switches partly to domestic commodities, pushing up price Si0 in the
importing country as well. Since η = 0 in this case, Equation (50) reveals that the convenience
yield in the importing country is proportional to the forward-hedged interest-rate spread:
Y ≡ (1 +Ri)− fX
X0
(1 +Re), (51)
which is obviously increasing in Ri.
Case 2 shares the feature with Case 4 that Si0 = k0−2a0l, since the fundamental consumer
in the importing country uses only local commodities. But the exporting country still carries
positive inventory. As Ri increases, the financial investor is able to purchase and import
more commodities as collateral. A higher collateral demand pushes up Se0, C
i
0, and y
i.
Case 1 is the most complicated case from a technical viewpoint (see Appendix B for
details), but comparative statics are easy to obtain in the limit of γes → 0, that is, the
speculator in the commodity futures market in the exporting country is close to being risk-
neutral. Although the risk-neutral assumption here is not without loss of generality, it is
a reasonable one to obtain tractability. For instance, the existing empirical studies find
mixed evidence on whether speculators earn significant excess returns by buying commodity
futures (see Section 5.3 for a discussion). In this limiting case, the commodity supplier in
the exporting country hedges the entire inventory and future production, (1− δ)Ie0 +Ge1, but
pays zero risk premium to do so. An increase in Ri still leads to a higher collateral demand
Ci0 and a higher convenience yield y
i, but commodity prices Si0 and S
e
0 are invariant to R
i.
Proposition 2 immediately implies the following useful corollary:
Corollary 1. Fixing other parameters, a higher unsecured interest rate Ri in the importing
country makes the relation between inventory and convenience yield more positive (or less
negative) in the importing country.
Note that the theory does not make a prediction on the inventory–convenience yield
relation in the exporting country. In the model, the convenience yield in the exporting
country ye = λ
(1−δ)Si0
is positive if the inventory Ie0 = 0; and I
e
0 is positive if y
e = 0. So ye
and Ie0 have no significant covariation in the model, regardless of the level of R
i.
3.3 Discussion
Our finding that commodity price can increase in the interest rate of the importing country
complements existing theory and evidence on the relation between interest rate and (real)
commodity prices. For example, Frankel (1986, 2006) shows that high interest rates reduce
the price of storable commodities by increasing the incentive for commodity extraction now
rather than in the future, by decreasing firms’ desire to carry inventories, and by encouraging
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speculators to shift out of commodity contracts and into Treasury bills. He finds a significant
and negative coefficient of real commodity price on the real U.S. interest rate, representing
global monetary policy, as well as on the real interest rate differential between non-U.S.
countries and the United States, representing local variations in monetary policy.
Complementary to Frankel’s work, our result focuses on the collateral role of commodities
as a device to circumvent capital control. In this case, a higher unsecured interest rate can
counterintuitively increase the demand for collateral and hence increase the global price of
commodities.
The collateral use of commodities in our model complements that of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). In their model, production assets, such as land and machineries, can also be pledged
as collateral. They show that a small, temporary negative shock to firms’ net worth can
be amplified as a large, persistent shock to the prices of assets and firms’ investments and
production. Our model is complementary in that the production asset, the commodity, is a
traded asset, and firms not involved in the real production can also import the commodity
to generate financial returns. In our model, if the production functions of the real sector are
invariant to the interest rate, more financial demand for the commodity can crowd out the
real demand by increasing commodity spot prices and by increasing the deadweight loss of
commodity storage.16 If, however, the production constraint can be relaxed by importing
commodities as collateral, we may reasonably expect the collateral demand for commodities
to increase total output at the cost of amplification and fragility, as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). The latter effect is not in our current analysis because we expect it to be similar to
that modeled by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The welfare implications of using commodities
as collateral are therefore ambiguous.
4 Data
This section describes the data and empirical measures used to test the model predictions.
4.1 A proxy for collateral demand of commodities
Ideally, one would want to measure the quantity of commodities that are pledged to lenders
as collateral. Unfortunately, such data are unavailable, except for the approximate indus-
try estimate, as mentioned earlier. Instead, we start from our theoretical framework and
construct a proxy for the attractiveness of importing commodities as collateral.
Recall from Equation (28) that the expected profit (in local currency) of importing one
16In the model, one can show that if Ri is higher, then the fundamental consumer of the commodity consumes
less of the commodity in period 0 and more of the commodity in period 1; overall, the fundamental consumption
of the commodity goes down because of a larger storage cost, δCi0, associated with a larger inventory.
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unit of commodity and using it as collateral, before hedging commodity price risk, is
Π = Si0(R
i − ri) + (1− δ)E[Si1]− (Se0 + h)(1 +Re)fX . (52)
Again, the first term is the profit of borrowing at the secured rate ri and investing at the
expected return Ri; the second term is the expected proceeds of selling the inventory in
period 1; and the third term is the repayment of borrowed funds in USD converted into CNY
at the forward exchange rate.
In Case 1 and Case 3 of the equilibrium, Si0 = (S
e
0 + h)X0, so Π can be reexpressed as
Π = Si0Y + (1− δ)E[Si1]− (1 + ri)Si0, (53)
where (recalling)
Y = (1 +Ri)− fX
X0
(1 +Re). (54)
The term (1 − δ)E[Si1] − (1 + ri)Si0 is the usual cost-of-carry calculation for the expected
profit of keeping one unit of inventory. The new term, Si0Y , is the additional benefit of using
commodities as collateral. In Case 2 and Case 4 of the equilibrium, the expression is similar
but has an extra linear term in η.
Therefore, the theory strongly suggests that the forward-hedged interest-rate spread Y
is a natural proxy for the attractiveness of importing commodities as collateral. While the
comparative statics of Proposition 2 are calculated with respect to Ri, Ri and Y move one-
for-one, fixing other parameters.
Since the CNY unsecured interest rates paid by small firms in China (Ri) and the USD
unsecured interest rates paid by the financial investor (Re) are unobservable to us, we use
interbank rates as proxies. The two interbank rates are CNY Shibor (Shanghai Interbank
Offered Rate) and USD Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate). Although Shibor is relatively
recent (starting in 2006), it closely tracks the actual interbank lending rates calculated by
the People’s Bank of China at monthly frequency (see Figure 3). With these proxies, our
empirical measure is
Yˆ = (1 + Shibor)− fX
X0
(1 + Libor). (55)
We calculate Yˆ using three-month Libor, three-month Shibor, the official spot USDCNY
exchange rate, and the three-month nondeliverable forward (NDF) USDCNY exchange rate.
The forward-hedged interest rate spread Yˆ can also be viewed as the deviations from the
covered interest-rate parity (CIP) in the USDCNY exchange rate, calculated using unsecured
interbank rates.
Some readers may worry that Shibor significantly underestimates the true funding costs
of small firms in China, and may suggest that we should use interest rates paid by “high-
yield” Chinese borrowers that are much riskier than banks. This alternative route is very
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Figure 3: Shibor (weekly) versus quantity-weighted average lending rate (monthly)
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Data source of actual lending rates: People’s Bank of China
difficult because reliable high-yield data in China with reasonable sample length cannot be
obtained.17 Moreover, we argue that even if such data were available, one could not use it
directly without further decomposing the credit spread (high-yield interest rate minus Shibor)
into the expected default loss and the credit risk premium. This is because investors should
rationally deduct the expected default loss from the high-yield interest rate, and judge the
attractiveness of making the loan based on the trade-off between the credit risk premium
and the risk of default. Credit risk premium, default risk, and expected default loss are even
more difficult to measure in China than the high-yield interest rate itself. This concern is
almost absent for Shibor because Shibor involves very low default risk.18 In any case, what is
important for us is that Yˆ sufficiently captures the time variation, not necessarily the level,
of investors’ demand for commodities as collateral. Any noise in this measure would make it
more difficult for us to find significant results in the data.
Our sample is weekly from October 13, 2006, to November 14, 2014, with 423 observations.
While this sample is relatively short, it is precisely during this period that commodities are
increasingly used as collateral for financing. Figure 4 plots our main proxy for the collateral
demand of commodities, Yˆ , in Panel (a), as well as its components, in Panels (b) and (c).
Overall, Yˆ is stationary and mean-reverting, reaching local peaks in early 2008, mid-2011,
and early 2014. Most of the time Yˆ > 0, implying a violation of the CIP in that CNY in
17For instance, the Wenzhou Private Finance Index only started in late 2012.
18Furthermore, if lending at Shibor does happen in equilibrium, one may also view the expected profit of lending
at Shibor (with very low default risk) as the investor’s “certainty equivalent” of making high-expected-return,
high-risk loans. This is because once the financial investor borrows CNY collateralized by commodities, he is free
to lend the proceeds to banks at Shibor with very low default risk or to lend to firms with higher expected return
but also higher risk. In equilibrium, the investor should be indifferent among all these options. If lending at Shibor
does not happen in equilibrium because of too low an expected return, then the Shibor-based proxy Yˆ is a lower
bound, in terms of investor’s utility function, on how attractive it is to import commodities as collateral.
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Figure 4: Proxy for collateral demand of commodities, Yˆ , and its components
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the forward FX market is priced “too high” relative to the spot exchange rate.19 The sole
19Violation of CIP also exists in other currency pairs. Pasquariello (2014) constructs a measure of CIP violations
over a broader set of currencies from 1990 to 2009. In his sample the CIP violation is around 0.2% before the
crisis, with a peak around 0.8% in 2009. By contrast, the CIP violations on USDCNY are high in early 2008,
mid-2011, and early 2014, with a larger magnitude at each occasion. Thus, China-specific capital control is likely
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exception is a short period in late 2008 and early 2009, the depth of the crisis, when Yˆ
dropped to its minimum. Because of capital control, this deviation from the CIP cannot be
eliminated by the usual arbitrage trades, which involve buying CNY in the spot market and
selling CNY in the forward market, both physically delivered. The higher the deviation, the
stronger the incentive to gain access to CNY investments by circumventing capital control,
such as by importing commodities.20
Panel (b) of Figure 4 plots the time-series behaviors of Libor and Shibor. While Libor
and Shibor are comparable before 2009, Shibor raises substantially above Libor after 2009.
Panel (c) shows that CNY has been slowly and steadily appreciating against USD over the
sample period.
4.2 Commodity prices and inventories
The commodities used to test the theoretical predictions are selected by two criteria. First,
the commodities should have active futures or forward markets in China and in developed
countries (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan). Having a forward or futures
market is important for calculating the convenience yield. Second, data for commodity prices
and inventories should go back to at least the start of 2009, when Shibor started to increase
substantially above Libor.
Applying these two criteria, we end up with eight commodities: copper, zinc, aluminum,
gold, soybean, corn, fuel oil, and natural rubber. We call the first four commodities the metal
group, and the last four commodities the nonmetal group. We would expect the metals to
be more suitable for collateral purposes as they are easier to store and have a higher value-
to-bulk ratio than nonmetal commodities. Thus, our model implications should be stronger
in the metal group than in the nonmetal group.
For each commodity, we use the leading exchange in China and the leading exchange in
developed markets as price data sources. With few exceptions, we take the prices of the first
and third futures contracts in both the Chinese market and the developed markets.21,22 Also
the dominant friction in driving CIP violation on USDCNY (in addition to higher funding and transaction frictions
in developed countries during the financial crisis).
20There are other ways to circumvent capital control. For example, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) report
that U.S. multinational firms circumvent capital control by reducing reported foreign profitability and increasing
dividends repatriation. In recent years it also has been widely suspected that certain companies in China “over-
invoice” exports as a way to bring capital into China. S. Rabinovitch, “China to crack down on faked export deals,”
Financial Times, May 6, 2013.
21Exceptions include the following: the price data for copper, zinc, and aluminum are obtained from LME as
cash prices and three-month forward prices, not futures prices. For some commodities we use the second contract.
Since fuel oil futures are not available in the United States, we use CME heating oil futures to proxy the fuel oil
futures. (Fuel oil is one type of heating oil.)
22Commodities traded in China are in CNY. Commodities traded in developed markets are in USD. (Rubber
prices are originally in Japanese Yen (JPY), and we convert them to USD.) We do not convert CNY to USD as
CNY is not fully convertible.
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Table 1: Data sources of commodities prices and inventories
Price data source Inventory data source
Commodity China Developed market China Developed market
Copper SHFE, first and third futures LME, cash and three-month forward SHFE LME
Zinc SHFE, first and third futures LME, cash and three-month forward SHFE LME
Aluminum SHFE, first and third futures LME, cash and three-month forward SHFE LME
Gold SHFE, first and third futures CME, first and third futures SHFE CME
Soybean DCE, first and third futures CME, first and second futures USDA USDA
Corn DCE, first and third futures CME, first and second futures USDA USDA
Fuel oil SHFE, first and third futures CME, first and third futures SHFE CME
Natural rubber SHFE, first and third futures TOCOM, first and second futures SHFE TOCOM
Acronyms. SHFE: Shanghai Futures Exchanges. LME: London Metal Exchange. DCE: Dalian
Commodity Exchanges. CME: CME Group. TOCOM: Tokyo Commodity Exchange. USDA:
United States Department of Agriculture.
with few exceptions, all price and inventory data are weekly observations from October 13,
2006, to November 14, 2014.
Following the standard approach in the literature (see, for example, Gorton, Hayashi,
and Rouwenhorst 2013), we proxy commodities inventories by those in exchange warehouses
whenever available. For our purposes of studying time variations, the inventory in exchange
warehouses is a reasonable proxy for the market-wide inventory, as long as they are sufficiently
correlated with each other. Inventory data for copper, zinc, aluminum, gold, fuel oil, and
natural rubber are obtained from various exchanges this way. Inventories of two agricultural
commodities, soybean and corn, are obtained from U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Table 1 summarizes the data sources for commodity prices and inventories.
Besides Yˆ , other variables used in the empirical analysis are defined as follows.
• γt denotes the local interest rate (Shibor or Libor).
• St denotes spot prices extrapolated from traded futures prices. We follow Pindyck
(2001) in inferring these spot prices because spot prices are often unavailable (except
cash prices for copper, zinc, and aluminum on the LME).
• yt denotes the convenience yield in the Chinese market or developed markets, calculated
as
yt =
ln(F (t, T1))− ln(F (t, T2))
T2 − T1 + γt, (56)
where F (t, T1) and F (t, T2) are futures prices at week t with maturity T1 and T2,
respectively.
• It denotes the inventory in China or developed markets. Because inventories tend to
have a time trend, we detrend the inventory level by the average inventory over the
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previous year:
Iˆt = It − 1
52
52∑
j=1
It−j . (57)
The detrended inventory Iˆt will be our main measure of inventory. Detrending inven-
tory is a common approach in the literature (see, for example, Gorton, Hayashi, and
Rouwenhorst 2013).
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the main variables. Most variables are in
percents. In particular, the standard deviation of the collateral demand proxy Yˆ is 82 basis
points (bps) per week, which we will later use to assess the economic importance of the
collateral demand for commodities.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test two empirical predictions of our theory: how the demand for com-
modities as collateral, proxied by Yˆ , affects (i) commodity prices and (ii) the relation between
inventory and convenience yield. In the next section we will check the robustness of these
tests to the inclusion of China’s macroeconomic conditions.
5.1 Commodity prices
Proposition 2 predicts that a higher collateral demand increases commodity spot prices. To
test this prediction, for each commodity, we regress the log price change on contempora-
neous changes in local convenience yield, local interest rate, and the collateral-demand-for-
commodities proxy:
∆ ln(St) = a+ b∆yt + c∆γt + d∆Yˆt + t. (58)
The local convenience yield and local interest rates are control variables for the benefit and
opportunity cost of holding commodities. For example, Pindyck (1993) argues that because
the convenience yield is considered a benefit of holding commodities, spot prices should have
a cointegration relation with convenience yield. Frankel (2006) shows that a higher interest
rate is associated with lower commodity prices.
We also run separate panel regressions on the metal group and the nonmetal group:
∆ ln(Si,t) = ai + b∆yi,t + c∆γi,t + d∆Yˆt + i,t. (59)
Our theory predicts that the coefficient d on ∆Yˆt should be positive in both China and
developed markets.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
(a) Collateral demand proxy Yˆ and its components
Yˆ (%) Shibor (%) Libor (%) USDCNY spot USDCNY forward
Mean 0.76 3.74 1.44 6.69 6.68
Std. dev. 0.82 1.31 1.84 0.5 0.46
Median 0.66 3.94 0.39 6.66 6.65
(b) Commodity spot prices St and convenience yields yt
China Developed markets
all in % ∆ log(St) yt ∆ log(St) yt
Copper Mean –0.09 8.94 –0.02 1.79
Std. dev. 3.53 12.55 4.23 3.75
Median –0.05 6.74 –0.03 0.2
Zinc Mean –0.17 –1.45 –0.12 –2.56
Std. dev. 3.63 10.22 4.73 3.93
Median 0.1 –1.78 –0.2 –3.21
Aluminum Mean –0.1 0.73 –0.06 –4.44
Std. dev. 2.15 12.85 3.41 4.63
Median –0.11 –0.42 –0.2 –5.13
Gold Mean 0.02 1.23 0.08 –0.38
Std. dev. 2.82 12.15 2.46 1.03
Median 0.1 1.34 0.34 –0.32
Soybean Mean 0.07 11.68 0.13 8.59
Std. dev. 3.22 16.71 4.26 25.26
Median –0.23 13.52 0.48 –1.34
Corn Mean 0.15 –3.65 0.05 –3.26
Std. dev. 2.16 12.48 5 20.15
Median 0.06 –4.77 0.35 –9.25
Fuel oil Mean 0.01 –12 0.08 –3.99
Std. dev. 5.63 30.65 4.21 9.81
Median 0.1 –12.8 0.12 –3.09
Rubber Mean –0.12 2.02 –0.02 0.67
Std. dev. 4.12 21.41 5.98 33.38
Median 0.24 –3.3 0.02 –4.68
Lastly, we run a larger panel regression across all eight commodities:
∆ ln(Si,t) = ai + b∆yi,t + c∆γi,t + d∆Yˆt + ~f · 1(Metal) · [∆yi,t,∆γi,t,∆Yˆt] + i,t, (60)
where 1(Metal) is the indicator function on metals (taking the value of 1 if the commodity
is a metal and 0 otherwise), and the full set of interactive terms 1(Metal) · [∆yi,t,∆γi,t,∆Yˆt]
captures the effect of metals versus nonmetals. Of particular interest is the coefficient for
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1(Metal)·∆Yˆt, which captures the extent to which metal prices are more responsive to changes
in collateral demand than nonmetal prices. We expect the coefficient for 1(Metal) · Yˆt to be
nonnegative.
Table 3 reports the results in Panel (a) for China and Panel (b) for developed markets.
For the metal group, as predicted by the theory, the panel regression shows a significantly
positive d, suggesting that a higher demand to import commodities as collateral to China is
associated with higher commodity prices in China and globally. For example, in the panel
regression, if Yˆ increases by 82 bps over a week (one standard deviation of Yˆ ), then metal
prices overall increase by 2.92% (= 0.82%× 3.564) in China and 3.96% (= 0.82%× 4.828) in
developed markets. These are large magnitudes. The eight commodity-by-commodity regres-
sions on metals reveal a significantly positive d, with the sole exception of gold in developed
markets. The economic magnitudes are similar. If Yˆ increases by one standard deviation, 82
bps, the contemporaneous increases in metal prices range from 2.63% for aluminum in China
to 5.27% for copper in developed markets.
For the nonmetal group, the panel regressions and most individual commodity regressions
also show a significantly positive d, although the magnitudes are smaller than those in the
metal group. On average, an increase in Yˆ by one standard deviation (82 bps) corresponds to
a higher nonmetal commodity price of 1.29% in China and 2.85% in developed markets. The
formal test reported in column (11) indicates that the metal-nonmetal difference is positive
and statistically significant in both China and developed markets, and this difference is larger
in China. These patterns are intuitive, as nonmetals are bulkier and more difficult to store
and ship than metals.
5.2 The Relation between inventory and convenience yield
A negative relation between inventory and convenience yield is the key element in the theory
of storage. In this theory, a low inventory corresponds to a high convenience yield of holding
commodities because it increases the real option value of consuming a commodity anytime.
In our model of commodity as collateral, however, the relation is the reverse. As shown
in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, an increase in collateral demand tends to simultaneously
increase inventories and convenience yield in the importing country. Thus, complementary to
the theory of storage, a higher collateral demand for a commodity should make the inventory–
convenience yield relation less negative in China. The theory makes no prediction about the
inventory–convenience yield relation in developed markets, so the test here is restricted to
China.
To test the inventory–convenience yield relation in the presence of the collateral use of
commodities, we first normalize each detrended inventory by its time-series standard devia-
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tion:
I˜i,t =
Iˆi,t√
Var(Iˆi,t)
. (61)
Because commodity inventories have different units and scales, normalization makes it easier
to interpret the regression coefficient.
As before, we run separate panel regressions for the metal group and the nonmetal group:
yi,t = ai + bI˜i,t + cI˜i,tYˆt + i,t = ai + I˜i,t(b+ cYˆt) + i,t. (62)
We also run commodity-by-commodity regressions:
yt = a+ bI˜t + cI˜tYˆt + t = a+ I˜t(b+ cYˆt) + t. (63)
As in the previous test, we run an eight-commodity panel regression with the metal
indicator 1(Metal):
yi,t = ai + I˜i,t(b+ cYˆt) + ~f · 1(Metal) · [I˜i,t, I˜i,tYˆt] + i,t. (64)
The specifications in regressions (62), (63), and (64) make clear that it is the relation
between yi,t and I˜i,t that we are testing. The coefficient b captures the effect predicted by the
theory of storage, and the coefficient c captures the incremental effect predicted by our model
of commodity as collateral. Our theory predicts that c is positive in China, that is, the higher
the benefit of importing commodities as collateral, the more positive (or the less negative)
the inventory–convenience yield relation. The coefficient for 1(Metal) · I˜i,tYˆt captures the
metal-nonmetal differential effect of collateral demand on the inventory–convenience yield
relation. We also expect the coefficient for 1(Metal) · I˜i,tYˆt to be nonnegative since metals
are more suitable collateral than nonmetals.
Table 4 reports the results of regressions (62) and (63). As predicted by the theory, the
panel regression on the metal group in China shows a significantly positive coefficient c on
Iˆi,tYˆt. It reveals that the collateral use of commodities makes the inventory–convenience
yield relation less negative. In individual commodity regressions, the same result is observed
for zinc and gold, although the coefficients for copper and aluminum are insignificant. By
contrast, the coefficient c for the nonmetal group is insignificant, in both the panel regression
and individual commodity regressions. In the pooled regression of column (11), the coefficient
for 1(Metal) · Iˆi,tYˆt has the expected sign, but marginal significance with a t-statistic of 1.61.
Despite weaker statistical significance, the test results here are consistent with the previous
test and the theoretical predictions.
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5.3 A brief discussion of the commodity futures risk premium
The key driver of futures risk premium in our model is the theory of normal backwardation.
As argued by Keynes (1923), Hirshleifer (1990), and Bessembinder (1992), hedgers need
to offer risk premiums in order to solicit speculators to offset their trades. Therefore, the
theory of normal backwardation predicts that speculators who take long positions in futures
contracts should earn a positive risk premium on average.
Empirically, however, tests of the theory of normal backwardation have yielded mixed
results. For example, Rockwell (1967) and Dusak (1973) fail to find significant risk premiums
in the futures contracts and thus reject the theory of normal backwardation. Using twenty-
nine commodities futures, Kolb (1992) documents that less than one-third of commodities
exhibit statistically significant positive average returns. On the other hand, Chang (1985)
and Bessembinder (1992) find evidence supporting the theory of normal backwardation. In
a review article by Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012), the authors retest the theory of normal
backwardation using three different test methodologies in a recent sample of futures data.
None of the tests find significant evidence that supports the theory of normal backwardation.
The authors conclude that “the empirical support for the theory of normal backwardation is
weak” (p. 456).
The weak empirical support for the theory of normal backwardation implies that any
prediction from our model regarding the futures risk premium is likely weak at best. In
particular, in our setting, the theory of normal backwardation predicts that futures risk
premium should respond to Ri in the same way inventory does; that is, if the demand for
collateral commodities goes up in week t, the futures risk premium realized in week t + 1
should go up in China and go down in developed markets. But a test of this prediction is
essentially a joint test of the theory of normal backwardation and our theory of commodity
as collateral. In the data, we find no evidence of this joint prediction, that is, the collateral
demand in week t cannot predict the futures risk premium realized in week t + 1. Given
the weak empirical support for the theory of normal backwardation, the lack of empirical
evidence on risk premium in our setting is not that surprising and does not go against our
theory of collateral. Indeed, we show that our theoretical predictions regarding commodity
prices and the inventory–convenience yield relation, which do not rely on the theory of normal
backwardation, are supported in the data.
6 Robustness to China’s Macroeconomic Conditions
One may be concerned that the evidence shown in the previous section is partly driven by
macroeconomic fundamentals, not frictions like capital control. In this section, we show
that our empirical results are robust to the inclusion of China’s macroeconomic conditions
as control variables. Because China is the leading consumer and importer of commodities,
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China’s macroeconomic fundamentals have large impacts on global commodities markets and
hence are the most relevant controls for our purpose.
We use six indicators for China’s macroeconomic conditions: Purchasing Managers Index
(PMI), industry value added, electricity generation, rail freight volume, money supply, and
Consumer Price Index (CPI), all obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
All raw variables are at monthly frequency and converted to year-on-year growth. The
sample is monthly from October 2006 to October 2014. Since these variables cover closely
related aspects of China’s economy, they are often correlated with one another. To make
interpretation easier, we will include the six principal components (PCs) of the six indicators,
instead of the raw data, in the regressions as control variables. The information content of
the PCs is of course identical to the information in the raw indicators. The first three PCs
of the six macroeconomic indicators explain 66.2%, 17.7%, and 7.7%, totaling 91.5%, of all
time-series variations in the six indicators.
Moreover, since the macroeconomic data are available monthly but all other data are
weekly, we construct weekly macroeconomic indicators by assuming that the year-on-year
growth of each variable in each week is equal to that of the relevant month. Note that
this assumption biases toward finding more significance on the macroeconomic indicators
because macroeconomic data for each month are usually released after month end; hence, it
is a conservative model specification for our purposes.
We run the same weekly regressions as in the previous section, but controlling for the PCs
of the macroeconomic indicators. First, the following panel regressions are run separately on
the metal group and nonmetal group:
∆ ln(Si,t) = ai + b∆yi,t + c∆γi,t + d∆Yˆt + ~f · ~MPCt + i,t, (65)
where ~MPCt is the vector of the six macroeconomic PCs and ~f is a vector of six con-
stants. The individual commodity regressions have the same form. We run these regres-
sions in China and in developed markets, both controlling for ~MPC. Lastly, we run an
eight-commodity panel regression with a full set of interactive terms of the form 1(Metal) ·
[∆yi,t,∆γi,t,∆Yˆt, ~MPCt]. As before, we expect d to be positive and the coefficient for
1(Metal) ·∆Yˆt to be nonnegative.
Second, we run the panel regressions on the relation between inventory and convenience
yield:
yi,t = ai + bI˜i,t + cI˜i,tYˆt + ~f · ~MPCt + ~g ·
(
~MPCt · I˜i,t
)
+ i,t, (66)
where we control both the macroeconomic PCs themselves and their interactions with in-
ventory. This way, we allow the macroeconomic PCs to affect both the level of convenience
yield and the inventory–convenience yield relation. The individual commodity regressions
have the same form. Also as before, we run an eight-commodity panel regression with a
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full set of interactive terms of the form 1(Metal) · [I˜i,t, I˜i,tYˆt, ~MPCt, ~MPCt · I˜i,t]. As before,
we expect c to be positive and the coefficient for 1(Metal) · I˜i,tYˆt to be nonnegative. The
inventory–convenience yield regression is run only in China because, again, the theory makes
no prediction about the inventory–convenience yield relation in developed markets.
The results from regression (65) are reported in Table 5, for prices in China, and Table 6,
for prices in developed markets. Comparing Tables 5 and 6 with Table 3, we see that the
coefficients in front of ∆Yˆt are robust to the inclusion of China’s macroeconomic conditions.
They remain significant and have almost identical magnitude. Controlling for macroeconomic
conditions in China, a one-standard-deviation increase of Yˆt corresponds to an increase of
metal prices by 2.85% (= 0.82%×3.481) in China and 3.86% (= 0.82%×4.702) in developed
markets. For copper in developed markets, the price increase is as high as 5.11% (= 0.82%×
6.236) given the same increase in Yˆt. And as in the regression without macroeconomic control
variables, the coefficient d for nonmetal commodities is also mostly significant but smaller in
magnitude than the metal group counterpart. As in Table 3, metals are more sensitive than
nonmetals in both China and developed markets, with a stronger effect in China. Overall,
this evidence suggests that China’s collateral demand and fundamental demand operate
separately in a nonoverlapping fashion in driving commodity prices.
Table 7 reports the result for regression (66). As before, the metal group panel regression
produces a significantly positive coefficient in front of I˜i,tYˆt, but the nonmetal group panel
regression does not. Comparing Table 7 with Table 4, we see that the coefficient for I˜i,tYˆt
in the metals panel regression roughly doubles once macroeconomic controls are included.
In individual commodity regressions, zinc and gold have significant coefficients in front of
I˜i,tYˆt, just like in Table 4, and the magnitudes are marginally larger than those in Table 4.
Moreover, once macroeconomic conditions are controlled for, the metal-nonmetal difference in
column (11) becomes statistically significant. Overall, the effect of collateral demand on the
inventory–convenience yield relation is robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic indicators.
(We rerun monthly regressions in Appendix C and results are similar.)
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we propose and test a theory of using commodities as collateral for financing. In
the presence of capital control and collateral constraint, financial investors import commodi-
ties and pledge them as collateral to earn higher expected returns. A simple model shows
that, all else equal, higher (lower) collateral demand increases (decreases) the concurrent
commodity spot prices globally; it also increases (decreases) inventory and convenience yield
simultaneously in the importing country.
We test the model predictions in China and developed markets, using price and inventory
data of four metals and four nonmetal commodities, from October 13, 2006, to November
14, 2014. Our empirical proxy for collateral demand of commodities is the forward-hedged
interest-rate spread, which is essentially the deviation from the covered interest-rate parity.
Because of capital control in China, this proxy in our sample period is almost always positive
and mean-reverting.
Empirical tests strongly support our theory. Higher collateral demand for commodities
is associated with (i) higher commodity prices globally, and (ii) a less negative inventory–
convenience yield relation in China. The economic magnitude is also large. For example,
a one-standard-deviation increase in collateral demand increases metal prices by about 3%
in China and by about 4% in developed markets. The same change in collateral demand
increases nonmetal commodity prices by about 1.3% in China and 2.9% in developed markets.
The estimates remain significant with roughly the same magnitude even after controlling for
China’s economic fundamentals.
Our contribution to the commodities literature can be summarized along the three im-
portant dimensions highlighted by Cheng and Xiong (2014): storage, risk sharing, and in-
formation discovery. In terms of storage, we show that the relation between inventory and
convenience yield, which is negative under the classic theory of storage, becomes significantly
less negative if inventories are also held for collateral purposes. With regard to risk-sharing,
we find evidence of intermarket spillover: commodity prices are strongly affected by CIP vi-
olation in the foreign exchange market. And, for information discovery, we show that higher
commodity prices do not necessarily imply strong fundamental demand; rather, they could
reflect collateral demand caused by capital control and financing frictions.
More broadly, this paper concretely illustrates the unintended consequences of capital
control on asset prices through the collateral channel. Given that capital control is increas-
ingly used by emerging economies as a policy tool to enhance financial stability, our results
serve as a fresh reminder of the associated distortions.
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Appendix
A Glossary of key model variables
Table A1: Key model variables
Variables in the top block are exogenous; variables in the bottom block are endogenous.
Variable Explanation
rj, Rj The secured and unsecured interest rate in country j ∈ {e, i}
δ Storage cost of commodity
h Shipping cost of commodity
Get Commodity production of the exporting country at time t
kt, l If D
i
t units of commodity are used, the fundamental consumer’s
profit per unit of commodity is kt − Sit − lDit.
a0, a1 Commodity supply in the importing country is at in period t
γep, γ
e
s Risk-aversion coefficients of commodity producer and financial
speculator in the exporting country
γid, γ
i
c Risk-aversion coefficients of fundamental commodity consumer and
financial investor in the importing country
Xt, fX Spot and forward exchange rates between the two countries’ cur-
rencies
Sjt Spot commodity price in period t in country j ∈ {e, i}
F j Futures price in country j ∈ {e, i}, traded at t = 0 and delivered
at t = 1
Iet Commodity inventory in the exporting country at time t
Dit,f , D
i
t,d Fundamental demand at time t of foreign and domestic commodity
Ci0 Collateral commodity demand in period 0, all imported
λ Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint Ie0 ≥ 0
η Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint Di0,f ≥ 0
hep, h
e
s Positions of futures contracts of commodity producer and financial
speculator in exporting country in period 0
hid, h
i
c Positions of futures contracts of fundamental commodity consumer
and financial investor in importing country in period 0
σjS Volatility of S
j
1 for j ∈ {e, i}
B Proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
In this appendix we show detailed steps in solving the equilibrium characterized in Proposi-
tion 1 and the comparative statics in Proposition 2. The parametric conditions (Technical
Conditions 1–3) for this equilibrium are summarized in Appendix B.1.
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Define uX = E[X1] and σSe1 ,X1 = Cov[S
e
1, X1]. Recall (σ
e
S)
2 = Var[Se1].
For the simplicity of notations, we further define the constants (m,n, q, b, v, w, z, o) as
follows:
m =
1(
σiS
)2 (γid + γicγidγic
)
, (A1)
n =
1(
σeS
)2 (γes + γepγesγep
)
, (A2)
q = µk + (1− δ)k0 − 2l ((1− δ)a0 + a1)− 2l ((1− δ)Ge0 +Ge1) , (A3)
b =
q − σSe1 ,X1
uX
, (A4)
v =
1− δ
2l
, (A5)
w =
fX
X0
(1 +Re)− (Ri − ri)
1− δ , (A6)
z =
1 + re
1− δ , (A7)
o =
1 +Re
1− δ
fX
X0
. (A8)
Note that as Ri increases, w decreases, but none of the other variables are directly affected
by Ri. Only b and n may be indirectly affected by Ri through the endogenous constants
σSe1 ,X1 and (σ
e
S)
2.
By canceling out Di0,f and D
i
0,d in the system of seven equations, we get a system of five
equations:
Ge0 − Ie0 =
[
k0 − Si0
2l
− a0
]
+
(
γid + γ
i
c
γidγ
i
c
)
E
[
Si1 − F i
]
(1− δ) (σiS)2 , (A9)
Ie0 (1− δ) +Ge1 =
γes + γ
e
p
γesγ
e
p
E [Se1 − F e](
σeS
)2 , (A10)
Ie0 (1− δ) +Ge1 =
k1 − Si1
2l
−
(
a1 +
(
γid + γ
i
c
γidγ
i
c
)
E
[
Si1 − F i
](
σiS
)2
)
, (A11)
Si1 = (S
e
1 + h)X1, (A12)
Si0 = (S
e
0 + h)X0 − 2lη. (A13)
Our solution strategy is to first write Se0, S
e
1, S
i
1, F
e, and F i as functions of Si0 and then
solve for Si0.
From Equations (A9) and (A11) we get(
σiS
)2
= (σk)
2 , (A14)
E
[
Si1
]
= µk + (1− δ)k0 − 2l((1− δ)a0 + a1)− 2l ((1− δ)Ge0 +Ge1)− (1− δ)Si0
= q − (1− δ)Si0. (A15)
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We also get
E [Se1] =
E
[
Si1
]− σSe1 ,X1
uX
− h, (A16)
(σeS)
2 = Var
[
Si1
X1
]
. (A17)
The futures prices are given by
F e =
Se0 (1 + r
e)− λ
1− δ =
(
Si0+2lη
X0
− h
)
(1 + re)− λ
1− δ (A18)
=
z
X0
Si0 − hz +
2lzη
X0
− λ
1− δ , (A19)
F i =
(
fX
X0
(1 +Re)− (Ri − ri)
)
1− δ S
i
0 +
fX
X0
2l (1 +Re)
1− δ η. (A20)
Equations (A9) and (A10) can be rewritten as
Ge0 − Ie0 =
[
k0 − Si0
2l
− a0
]
+
m
(1− δ)E
[
Si1 − F i
]
, (A21)
Ie0 (1− δ) +Ge1 = nE [Se1 − F e] . (A22)
Substituting in the expressions of E[Se1], E[S
i
1], F
e, and F i, we have
(1− δ)Ge0 +Ge1 = (1− δ)
[
k0 − Si0
2l
− a0
]
+mE
[
Si1 − F i
]
+ nE [Se1 − F e]
=
(1− δ) (k0 − 2a0l)
2l
− vSi0 (A23)
+mq − (1− δ + w)mSi0 − 2lmoη
+n (b− h+ zh)− ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)nSi0 − 2lnzη/X0 +
nλ
1− δ .
Thus,
Si0 =
[
(1−δ)(k0−2a0l)
2l +mq + n (b− h+ zh)− [Ge0 (1− δ) +Ge1]
+ n1−δλ− 2l (om+ zn/X0) η
]
v + (1− δ + w)m+ ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)n , (A24)
Se0 =
Si0 + 2lη
X0
− h. (A25)
By Equations (A9) and (A11), the period 1 prices are
Si1 = E[S
i
1] + k1 − µk = q − (1− δ)Si0 + k1 − µk, (A26)
Se1 =
Si1
X1
− h. (A27)
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By Equation (A10), the inventory in the exporting country is
Ie0 =
1
1− δ
[
n (b− h+ zh)− ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)nSi0 −Ge1 − 2nlzη/X0 +
nλ
1− δ
]
. (A28)
Furthermore,
Ci0 =
m
1− δ
[
q − (1− δ + w)Si0 − 2loη
]
. (A29)
The last step is to solve the two endogenous constants σSe1 ,X1 and (σ
e
S)
2, since they depend
on the equilibrium commodity prices. By definition, σSe1 ,X1 is given by
σSe1 ,X1 = Cov
[
Si1
X1
− h,X1
]
= Cov
[
k1
X1
, X1
]
+ (q − µk − (1− δ)Si0)Cov
[
1
X1
, X1
]
, (A30)
where we have substituted in the equilibrium Si0. Similarly, (σ
e
S)
2 is given by
(σeS)
2 = Var
[
q − (1− δ)Si0 + k1 − µk
X1
]
. (A31)
Note that σSe1 ,X1 and (σ
e
S)
2 are trivially read out from Equations (A30) and (A31) as long
as Si0 does not depend on b or n in equilibrium.
There are four cases. For the simplicity of exposition, we start with Case 4 and finish
with Case 1.
Case 4 (λ > 0 and η > 0, that is, Ie0 = 0 and D
i
0,f = 0). In this case, the
collateral demand drives up the price in the exporting country sufficiently and produces two
effects. First, the commodity producer in the exporting country has a stockout. Second, the
fundamental commodity demand in the importing country is met entirely by the cheaper
local commodity supply (after adjusting for shipping cost). This corresponds to Ie0 = 0 and
Di0,f = 0, which implies that S
i
0 = k0 − 2a0l. Therefore, we have
Si0 =
[
(1−δ)(k0−2a0l)
2l +mq + n (b− h+ zh)− [Ge0 (1− δ) +Ge1]
+ n1−δλ− 2l (om+ zn/X0) η
]
v + (1− δ + w)m+ ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)n = k0 − 2a0l, (A32)
Ie0 =
1
1− δ
[
n (b− h+ zh)− ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)nSi0 −Ge1 − 2nlzη/X0 +
nλ
1− δ
]
= 0.
(A33)
We can solve λ and η from the above two equations. Then, it is easy to further solve all
other variables in the equilibrium.
In particular, from Equations (A32)–(A33), we get
(1− δ + w)(k0 − 2a0l) + 2loη = q −m−1Ge0(1− δ). (A34)
Thus, the importing country’s inventory is
C0 =
m
1− δ (q − (1− δ + w)S
i
0 − 2loη) = Ge0,
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which is invariant to Ri. The importing country’s convenience yield is
yi = −w + 1 + r
i
1− δ −
2loη
Si0
.
By Equation (A34),
wSi0 + 2loη = q −m−1Ge0(1− δ)− (1− δ)(k0 − 2a0l),
which is also invariant to Ri. So yi is invariant to Ri.
Lastly, since the right-hand side of Equation (A34) is invariant to Ri, the left-hand side
must also be invariant to Ri. But as Ri increases, w decreases. So η must increase in Ri. By
Si0 = (S
e
0 + h)X0 − 2lη, we conclude that Se0 is increasing in Ri.
Case 3 (λ > 0 and η = 0, that is, Ie0 = 0 and D
i
0,f > 0). In this case, collateral
demand leads to a sufficiently high price and zero inventory in the exporting country. Since
Ie0 = 0 and η = 0, combining Equations (45) and (49), one can get
Si0 =
(1−δ)(k0−2a0l)
2l −Ge0(1− δ) +mq
v + (1− δ + w)m . (A35)
Thus, combining Equations (45) and (A35), one can solve for λ. After getting Si0 and λ, all
other variables can be solved.
Equation (A35) implies that Si0 increases in R
i, for w decreases in Ri. Given Si0 =
(Se0 + h)X0, S
e
0 also increases in R
i. The convenience yield given by Equation (50) also
increases in Ri by substituting in η = 0. Lastly, (1 − δ + w)Si0 increases in w, so Ci0 as in
Equation (A29) increases in Ri.
Case 2 (λ = 0 and η > 0, that is, Ie0 > 0 and D
i
0,f = 0). In this case, collateral
demand leads to zero import by fundamental consumers. Thus,
Di0,f =
k0 − 2a0l − Si0
2l
= 0, (A36)
or Si0 = k0 − 2a0l, as in Case 4.
Given λ = 0, from Equation (45) we can explicitly obtain η. After getting Si0 and η, we
can solve all other variables.
In this case, since Si0 is invariant to R
i, the right-hand side of Equation (45) is also
invariant to Ri. Moreover, σSe1 ,X1 and (σ
e
S)
2, given by Equations (A30)–(A31), are both
invariant to Ri; so are n and b. This means that the only terms on the right-hand side of
Equation (45) that can vary with Ri are w and η. Thus, as Ri increases, η must increase to
offset the effect of the decreasing w.
To calculate Ci0, we rewrite Equation (45) as
m[(1− δ + w)(k0 − 2a0l) + 2loη] = mq + n(b− h+ zh)− [Ge0(1− δ) +Ge1]− 2lznη/X0
− ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)n(k0 − 2a0l),
whose right-hand side is decreasing in η and hence decreasing in Ri. Then Equation (A29)
implies that Ci0 is increasing in R
i.
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By the same reasoning, we infer that w(k0 − 2a0l) + 2loη is decreasing in Ri, so
yi = −w + 1 + r
i
1− δ −
2loη
Si0
is increasing in Ri.
Case 1 (λ = 0 and η = 0, that is, Ie0 > 0 and D
i
0,f > 0). In this case, the demand
for collateral commodity does not lead to a stockout in the exporting country or zero import
by the fundamental consumer in the importing country. Since neither constraint is binding,
the equilibrium prices and inventory are given by Equations (45)–(49) after substituting in
λ = η = 0.
Since the expression of Si0 contains both n and b, the constants σSe1 ,X1 and (σ
e
S)
2 cannot
be read out from Equations (A30) and (A31); instead, they must solve a fixed point. The
only term on the right-hand side of Equation (A30) that contains σSe1 ,X1 is S
i
0, and S
i
0 is
decreasing in σSe1 ,X1 through its relation to the parameter b. Since Cov [1/X1, X1] < 0, a
larger σSe1 ,X1 reduces S
i
0 and reduces the right-hand side of Equation (A30). But the left-
hand side is obviously increasing in σSe1 ,X1 . This implies a unique solution of σSe1 ,X1 as an
endogenous constant.
The only term on the right-hand side of Equation (A31) that contains (σeS)
2 is Si0. Observe
that Equation (A31) has at least one solution because, as (σeS)
2 goes from 0 to infinity, the
right-hand side of Equation (A31) always stays positive and finite. The expression of Si0
contains (σeS)
2 through n, and n shows up in Si0 twice, once in the numerator and once in
the denominator, both linearly. Thus, potentially, there can be multiple roots of Equation
(A31). If multiple roots exist, we select one as follows. Recall that a unique solution exists
in Cases 2 and 3. Starting from Case 1, as Ri increases sufficiently, the equilibrium will move
to either Case 2 (fundamental consumer only uses domestic commodity) or Case 3 (stockout
in exporting country). Then, moving back from Case 2 or Case 3 to Case 1 by reducing Ri,
if multiple roots merge, we pick one that gives the continuity of equilibrium.
Explicit solutions and comparative statics can be obtained in the limit of γes → 0, since
in this case n→∞ and Equation (45) implies that
Si0 =
(q − σSe1 ,X1)/uX − h+ zh
(1− δ)/uX + z/X0 . (A37)
The combination of Equations (A37) and (A30) leads to a unique solution (Si0, σSe1 ,X1) that is
invariant to Ri. And (σeS)
2 is directly read out from Equation (A31). By Equation (A29), Ci0
is increasing in Ri since w is decreasing in Ri. And yi defined in Equation (50) is obviously
increasing in Ri.
B.1 Technical conditions
B.1.1 Zero non-collateral inventory in the importing country
Proposition 1 is solved under the condition that the commodity producer in the importing
country does not wish to keep inventory. This condition is equivalent to the convenience
45
yield, yi, given in Equation (50), being positive. Thus, in equilibrium, we need
(1 +Ri)− (1 +Re) fXX0
1− δ >
2loη
Si0
. (A38)
Case 1 and Case 3. In these cases η = 0, so Equation (A38) reduces to Y > 0, where
Y = (1 +Ri)− fXX0 (1 +Re) as in Equation (51).
Case 2. Combining Si0 = k0 − 2a0l, λ = 0, and Equation (45), we solve
η =
mq + n(b− h+ zh)− [Ge0(1− δ) +Ge1]− Si0[(1− δ + w)m+ ((1− δ)/uX + z/X0)n]
2l(om+ zn/X0)
.
(A39)
As Ri increases by one unit, the left-hand side of Equation (A38) increases by 1/(1−δ) units,
but the right-hand side of Equation (A38) increases by
2lo
Si0
· S
i
0m/(1− δ)
2l(om+ zn/X0)
<
1
1− δ
units, where we have used the fact that ∂w/∂Ri = −1/(1−δ). Thus, to ensure that Equation
(A38) holds for all η > 0, it suffices to ensure that Equation (A38) holds for η = 0, which
gives the condition Y > 0 again.
Case 4. From Equation (A34), we infer 2loη = q−m−1Ge0(1− δ)− (1− δ+w)(k0− 2a0l).
Substitute it into Equation (A38), we get
1 + ri
1− δ + (1− δ)−
q −m−1Ge0(1− δ)
k0 − 2a0l > 0. (A40)
Summarizing the four cases, we have the following two technical conditions.
Technical Condition 1.
(1 +Ri)− (1 +Re)fX
X0
> 0. (A41)
Technical Condition 2.
1 + ri
1− δ + (1− δ)−
q −m−1Ge0(1− δ)
k0 − 2a0l > 0. (A42)
B.1.2 Positive demand for collateral commodity
We also conjectured that Ci0 > 0, that is, a positive amount of commodity is imported as
collateral. By Equation (A29), this condition is
q − (1− δ + w)Si0 > 2loη. (A43)
In Case 1 and Case 3, this condition is equivalent to Si0 < q/(1 − δ + w). In Case 4,
Ci0 = G
e
0 > 0. In Case 2, if R
i increases by one unit, the left-hand side of Equation (A43)
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increases by Si0/(1− δ) units, but the right-hand side increases by
2lo
Si0m/(1− δ)
2l(om+ zn/X0)
<
Si0
1− δ
units. To guarantee Equation (A43) for all η > 0, it suffices to guarantee Equation (A43) for
η = 0, which again leads to Si0 < q/(1− δ + w). Summarizing these cases, we have
Technical Condition 3. In Proposition 1, we have
Si0 <
q
1− δ + w, (A44)
where Si0 is evaluated at the equilibrium levels in these cases.
Note that this condition is satisfied trivially in Case 4 (see above).
C Monthly regressions with China’s macroeconomic
conditions
In Section 6, we showed in weekly regressions that the main empirical results of this paper
are robust to the inclusion of China’s macroeconomic conditions as control variables. As a
further check, in this appendix we rerun the regressions using a monthly sample, where for
each month we take the observation on the last Friday. Tables A2, A3, and A4 report the
results. As we can see, although we lose three-quarters of the data in the monthly regressions,
most coefficients for ∆Yˆt and I˜i,tYˆt remain positive and statistically significant, with similar
or even larger economic magnitude than in weekly regressions reported in Section 6.
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